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Abstract
That social capital matters is an established fact in the social sciences. How different forms of so-
cial capital affect gender disadvantages in career advancement is less clear, however. Qualitative 
research suggests that women face disadvantages in project-based labor markets where recruit-
ment practices are based on informal and personal networks. Focusing on a project-based type 
of labor market, namely the U.S. film industry, this study argues that women suffer from social 
closure and face severe career disadvantages when collaborating in cohesive teams. At the same 
time, gender disadvantages are reduced for women who build social capital in open networks 
with a higher degree of diversity and information flow. I test and demonstrate these assump-
tions using a large-scale longitudinal dataset containing full career profiles of more than 1.2 
million performances by 101,090 film actors in 483,949 feature film productions between the 
years 1900−2010. In particular, I analyze career survival models and interaction effects between 
gender and different measures of social capital and information openness. The findings reveal 
that female actors have a higher risk of career failure than their male colleagues when affiliated 
in cohesive networks, but have better survival chances when embedded in open and diverse 
structures. This study contributes to the understanding of how and what type of social capital 
can be either a beneficial resource for otherwise disadvantaged groups or a constraining mecha-
nism that intensifies gender differences in career advancement.
Zusammenfassung
Sozialkapital stellt insbesondere auf projektorientierten Arbeitsmärkten eine wichtige Erfolgs-
ressource dar. Auf die Frage, wie verschiedene Formen der sozialen Einbettung auf geschlechts-
spezifische Erfolgsungleichheiten wirken, gibt es jedoch bislang keine eindeutige Antwort. Bishe-
rige Einzelfalluntersuchungen legen nahe, dass Frauen besonders dann benachteiligt sind, wenn 
Rekrutierungspraktiken in hohem Maße auf informellen und auf persönlichen Netzwerken 
beruhen. Am Beispiel eines projektorientierten und durch informelle Rekrutierung gekenn-
zeichneten „Winner-take-all“-Arbeitsmarktes – der US-Filmbranche – wird argumentiert, dass 
Frauen besonders dann Benachteiligungen erfahren, wenn sie ihre Karriere häufiger in engma-
schigen, stark kohäsiven Teams aufbauen. Dagegen können sie Benachteiligungen deutlich redu-
zieren, wenn sie sich häufiger in Projektteams bewegen, die sich durch offene Netzwerkstruktu-
ren und breite Erfahrungshintergründe auszeichnen. Auf Basis von Ereignisdatenanalysen und 
der Untersuchung vollständiger Karriereprofile von 101.090 US-Filmschauspielern in 483.949 
Spielfilmproduktionen mit mehr als 1,2 Millionen Engagements testet der Beitrag diese Argu-
mentation und zeigt – anhand diverser Indikatoren zur Messung von Teamkohäsion, Kollabo-
rationshäufigkeit, Informationszugang und -vielfalt –, dass kohäsive Netze geschlechtsspezifi-
sche Karriereungleichheiten verstärken, während offene Netzwerke Benachteiligungen deutlich 
reduzieren. Vermutlich sind der in diesen Netzen höhere Informationsfluss und vor allem die 
Diversität der geteilten Informationen entscheidende Faktoren, die geschlechtstypische Benach-
teiligungen aufheben können. Diese Studie erweitert das Verständnis darüber, wie und unter 
welchen Bedingungen Sozialkapital zu einer vorteilhaften Ressource für benachteiligte Gruppen 
wird, und wann es beschränkende, Benachteiligungen intensivierende Wirkungen entfaltet.
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Is There a Closure Penalty? Cohesive Network Structures, 
Diversity, and Gender Inequalities in Career Advancement
1 Introduction
Social capital has been an important concept and explanatory variable for a number of 
issues in the social sciences. Especially in economic sociology and organization stud-
ies, a burgeoning literature explains a wide range of outcomes using this concept (for 
an overview, see Adler/Kwon 2002). A central finding is that social capital has a func-
tional dimension for labor markets: it reduces information and search costs, matches 
supply with demand, and positively affects individual career advancement. Specifically, 
it helps in acquiring new jobs, establishing future collaborations, and creating teams 
(Burt 1992; Gabbay/Zuckerman 1998; Schwab/Miner 2008; Podolny/Baron 1997; Giuf-
fre 1999; Accominotti 2009; Granovetter [1974]1995). Social capital facilitates the share 
and transfer of knowledge within teams and among co-workers (Reagans/McEvily 
2003; Inkpen/Tsang 2005; Tortoriello/Reagans/McEvily 2012; Wei/Zheng/Zhang 2011), 
hastens the diffusion and creation of innovations (Cuevas-Rodríguez/Cabello-Medina/
Carmona-Lavado 2013; Tsai/Ghoshal 1998; Rost 2011; Rogers 2003; Obstfeld 2005) 
and enhances the productivity of teams (Reagans/Zuckerman 2001). Moreover, social 
capital affects team success and performance even in highly competitive, creative, and 
uncertain environments, such as video game production, musicals, professional soccer, 
or film production (Ferriani/Cattani/Baden-Fuller 2009; Grund 2012; Uzzi/Spiro 2005; 
Vaan/Vedres/Stark 2011; Balkundi/Harrison 2006).
Especially in project-based labor markets such as film, where recruitment practices are 
greatly dependent on interpersonal networks (Mathieu/Stjerne 2012; Ebbers/Wijnberg 
2010; Blair 2001, 2003; Andersen 2013; Bielby/Bielby 1999; Delmestri/Montanari/Usai 
2005; Jones 1996; Schwab/Miner 2008; Cattani/Ferriani 2008; Eikhof/Haunschild 2006; 
Eikhof/Haunschild 2007), social capital is highly important for getting jobs and struc-
turing the market. While much of the literature on social capital highlights its positive 
and functional aspects, there is a dysfunctional, “dark” side (Gargiulo/Benassi 1999): 
social closure. If recruitment is mainly a result of interpersonal network embeddedness, 
there is a tendency to exclude and discriminate actors, an exclusion based on ascrip-
tive characteristics that disregards talent (Tilly 1998; Bourdieu 1984, 1985; Lin 1999; 
DiMaggio/Garip 2012; Lin 2000). Qualitative research suggests that particularly women 
suffer from labor markets structured by informal recruitment practices, because men 
are more able to join important cohesive groups and get more return from their social 
capital investments (Grugulis/Stoyanova 2012; Roscigno/Garcia/Bobbitt-Zeher 2007; 
For helpful advice and comments, I would like to thank Annina Aßmann, Juan J. Fernandez, Alexan-
der van der Grinten, Uwe Gotzes, Isabella Reichert, and Martin Schröder.
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Christopherson 2009). Working in the creative industries means that actors have to 
network actively and extensively (Blair 2009): many jobs are negotiated through inter-
personal networks, often in the evenings over a beer. Especially when women have to 
raise children, they are at a particular disadvantage because men can allocate more time 
than can women to building such career-relevant network relationships. In addition, 
when teams are dominated by male gatekeepers, this research suggests that women have 
fewer chances than men to acquire new jobs, because job-relevant information tends to 
flow through gender-specific homogenous networks. 
However, research has still not systematically investigated whether and in what direc-
tion social capital and network structures affect women’s chances to advance their ca-
reers. That gender inequalities persist in project-based labor markets is a well-studied 
fact (Bielby/Bielby 1992, 1996; Lincoln/Allen 2004; Lutter 2012a), but it is less clear 
how different forms of social capital affect these disadvantages to women. So far, in-
sight has come from knowledge generated by in-depth interviews and case-study re-
search. As of now, no quantitative account explains how the exposure to different types 
of network structures affects gender disadvantages in careers. For instance, Petersen et 
al. (2000: 772–773) review the empirical literature on networks and gender segregation 
and conclude that systematic knowledge is still very limited. They quote Granovetter, 
who notes in his review that this research gap is precisely the one “most in need of fill-
ing” (Granovetter [1974]1995: 177). 
This article attempts to fill this gap. Drawing on social closure theory, I argue that gen-
der inequality is particularly striking when actors are exposed to cohesive project teams 
during their career, while gender inequality is less severe when actors are involved in 
weaker, diverse network structures that allow for different forms of information flow 
and variance. Using a unique panel dataset which includes full career profiles of more 
than 1.2 million performances by 101,090 film actors in the US feature-film industry 
and advanced measures of network embeddedness, the study sheds light on the long-
discussed but never quantitatively analyzed assumption that women are more likely 
to suffer from social closure. By analyzing interaction effects between gender and dif-
ferent measures of cohesion, social capital, and information diversity, the study finds 
that women face significant disadvantages during their career when they are affiliated 
more often with cohesive networks, a finding that is controlled for human capital and 
other success-related factors. Moreover, gender disadvantages are reduced substantially 
in careers featuring collaborations with less cohesive relations, weaker ties, and greater 
information diversity. If women engage in teams with greater genre and information 
diversity, the study finds they can reduce their risk of career failure to a level indistin-
guishable from that of men’s. Gender disadvantages are then fully negated. 
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2 Social capital and gender: Theory and hypotheses
The number and quality of relationships − such as colleagues or collaborations, friends 
or family − can be subsumed under the notion of social capital if this social structure 
in any way forms an asset or resource (Burt 1992: 9; Baker 1990: 619). The strength of 
personal ties is usually conceptualized by the amount or frequency of contact, emo-
tional affection, reciprocal behavior or trustworthiness (Granovetter 1973). Network 
structures can in different ways create social capital, either through strong, dense, and 
cohesive ties, or through network ties that are less cohesive, weaker, and more loosely 
connected (Burt 2000).
The classical approach comes from Coleman and highlights the assumption that strong 
ties or cohesive network structures form a beneficiary resource of social capital (Cole-
man 1988, 1990). According to Coleman, actors with frequent relationships are more 
likely to develop trust, conjoint identification, and shared norms among themselves, 
which in turn lead to reciprocal, cooperative, and pro-social behavior. In cohesive net-
works where actors interact repeatedly, the incentive to cooperate is relatively high be-
cause cooperation enhances a person’s chances to receive help the next time it is needed. 
Any favor an actor receives from a colleague imposes an obligation to reciprocate in the 
future. As a consequence, actors in frequent relationships invest more in social capital 
because they can expect a higher return from this investment, as opposed to weaker 
relationships or one-shot interactions. 
Contrary to this positive view, Bourdieu’s work on social capital (Bourdieu 1980, 1985) 
stresses the negative aspects: cohesion divides actors into insiders and outsiders, fosters 
discrimination and exclusion, and is likely to produce social closure (for an overview 
see Lin 1999: 483, Lin 2000). According to Bourdieu, members of a social group develop 
a specific habitus, which is socialized, shared, and maintained, often unconsciously. The 
habitus imparts the “feel for the game” (Blair 2009: 121), attaches members to the group, 
and makes membership visible. It creates distinctive features that signal belonging or 
exclusion (Bourdieu 1984). Closure mechanisms are especially prevalent in cohesive 
network structures because the specific habitus that develops within the group restricts 
outsiders from gaining access to the group. The group-specific habitus reduces the in-
tegration capacity of a cohesive group and perpetuates existing boundaries between 
groups. Hence, social closure is likely to reproduce social inequalities. 
Bourdieu’s critical approach is mirrored in the homophily principle from social net-
work theory (McPherson/Smith-Lovin/Cook 2001). According to this principle, net-
works tend to share and associate with those holding similar socioeconomic status, 
attitudes, behavior, and norms. The stronger the cohesion of the network, the more 
similar the network. One source of similarity is the greater potential for social control 
in cohesive groups. Any behavior that deviates from the group norm can be sanctioned, 
which in turn increases the group’s homogeneity. Sanctioning either prompts members 
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to alter their behavior, conform to what the group regards as legitimate, and thus repro-
duce habitus, or it causes non-conformist members to leave the group, if they are not 
excluded outright. 
With regard to gender inequality, it can be argued that particularly women are in danger 
of being disadvantaged by cohesive network structures, especially when the gatekeepers 
in these networks are male. Indeed, as research shows, the main gatekeepers in the film 
industry, e.g. producers, directors, writers, and editors, are as much as 80 to 90 percent 
male (Christopherson 2009: 88; Levy 1989: 36; Bielby/Bielby 1996: 254). Ascriptive cat-
egories are likely to influence membership in these project networks (Tilly 1998; Reskin 
2003; Kanter 1977). For instance, recent research suggests that job seekers in white/
male networks receive more relevant job information than do those in minority/female 
networks. At the same time, white/male networks consist of higher status contacts (Mc-
Donald 2011). Research on race inequality shows that personal contacts of the same 
race significantly increase same-race matching at the workgroup level (Stainback 2008; 
Petersen/Saporta/Seidel 2000). 
Segregated personal networks seem to reflect themselves in segregated workgroups. In 
turn, this gives some groups an advantage and puts other groups at a disadvantage. In 
fact, much of the effect of social capital on success in job-seeking is actually explained by 
the homophily principle and the tendency for similar groups to come together (Mouw 
2003; Ruef/Aldrich/Carter 2003; Schwab/Miner 2008; Faulkner/Anderson 1987), which 
increases the likelihood that ascriptive rather than meritocratic characteristics influence 
the hiring process. In addition, woman with children are at a particular disadvantage 
when recruitment practices are heavily influenced by interpersonal networks (Grugulis/
Stoyanova 2012). In a study using survey data, Munch et al. (1997) show that having a 
child significantly reduces the size of a women’s network, whereas there is no effect on 
men’s network size. Taking these factors together, gender-homophilous reproduction 
can result in severe cumulative gender disadvantages over a course of a career (Bielby/
Bielby 1992, 1996). 
Especially in project-based labor markets, where allocation and matching frequency is 
much higher than in traditional labor markets, gender-homophilous matching pro-
cesses can generate processes of “allocative discrimination” (Petersen/Saporta 2004), re-
sulting in “glass ceilings” (Powell/Butterfield 1994), “glass doors” (Fernandez/Abraham 
2011), or “old boy networks” (Jann 2003). This would explain why the film and media 
industries are biased towards a white, male, and middle-class workforce. According to 
Grugulis and Stoyanova (2012: 9), the workforce resembles the cultural background of 
the gatekeepers, who are also predominantly male, white, and middle class. At the same 
time, white, male, middle-class people have better economic resources to survive and 
adapt to the precarious and uncertain working conditions in the creative industries. 
Following this discussion, I propose hypothesis H1:
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H1: The greater the cohesion of a team’s network, the more pronounced are gender disad-
vantages in career advancement.
Another approach on social capital assumes that actors in weak or loosely connected 
network structures develop and benefit from social capital. Referring to the famous 
“strength of weak ties” theorem (Granovetter 1973), weak ties are exposed to a broader 
range of diverse communities because they bridge what Burt (1992) has called “struc-
tural holes”– insular groups of cohesive and distant networks. Actors who maintain 
weak ties can benefit from a brokerage position because they control the information 
flowing between two groups. A weak tie therefore connects and bridges otherwise sepa-
rated groups. The broker position benefits the broker by increasing his or her social 
status. More important, the position gives the broker access to different sorts of people, 
communities, and cultures. Therefore, weak ties offer a much broader exposure to in-
formation, which can be advantageous in building and making use of social capital (for 
empirical evidence, see: Giuffre 1999).
Both forms of embeddedness, weak and strong, can be seen as complementary because 
they both create relevant, albeit different forms of social capital (Rost 2011). On the one 
hand, less central nodes suffer from closure by being outsiders, yet weaker ties profit 
from the diversity and information variance of far-distant cultures. On the other hand, 
strong ties are penalized by less diversity but benefit from more reliable and trustworthy 
information that is shared in cohesive networks. 
Cohesion is especially beneficial in project teams when actors have to rely on the co-
operation of others in order to perform well or to receive important information that 
would otherwise be costly or impossible to access. Research shows that members in 
cohesive teams invest more time in sharing information (Reagans/McEvily 2003) and 
transfer tacit, complex, or secret knowledge more often (Hansen 1999). By contrast, 
people with weak ties share useful but less complex knowledge. 
Sharing complex knowledge is important for team success because complex informa-
tion is less obvious and produces competitive advantages for those who have access to 
it. Hence, trust and familiarity are important to produce successful outcomes. Research 
shows that this is true up to a certain threshold: too much familiarity is again detrimen-
tal for team success (Rost 2011; Vaan/Vedres/Stark 2011; Vedres/Stark 2010; Stark 2009; 
Gargiulo/Benassi 1999, 2000; Uzzi 1997). For instance, Uzzi and Spiro (2005) show that 
creativity and team performance increase with team density up to a certain point, after 
which their positive effect is reversed. Although creative teams need a certain degree of 
cohesion in order to facilitate trust, too much cohesion or over-embeddedness imposes 
creative restrictions on team members, which results in less innovative outcomes. In a 
study on R&D teams, Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) find evidence that the effect of 
density on team performance is strongest when the cohesive team is also heterogeneous.
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Creative teams also need the disruptive and dissonant features that are brought in 
through weak tie brokers bridging structural holes or by newcomers with different genre 
backgrounds who bring in fresh perspectives and new ideas (Perretti/Negro 2007; Stark 
2009; Vedres/Stark 2010; March 1991; Ferriani/Cattani/Baden-Fuller 2009; Cattani/Fer-
riani 2008). In light of these findings, I assume that women suffer from closure tenden-
cies in cohesive networks, as proposed with hypothesis 1, but they can take advantage 
of weaker and more diverse networks. These structures make them less dependent on 
a few (mostly male) gatekeepers who decide whether or not they are to be included in 
the in-group. They can diversify their risks and assets to a much greater extent and can 
have access to wider pools of information, which should result in lower dropout rates 
for women and reduced gender differences on average. Hence, I propose that gender 
inequality is decreased if women are attached to more open and diverse team structures.
H2: Gender disadvantages decrease in network architectures that are more open with re-
gard to the diversity of ties, information flow, and genre background. 
3 Data and method
This study uses data from the Internet Movie Database, which is currently the most 
complete database on movies, film makers, and the film industry worldwide. At present, 
it contains information on approximately two million film and TV productions, as well 
as more than four million individuals (actors, producers, directors, cinematographers, 
writers, designers, etc.). The database has a relatively high degree of validity because us-
ers can report errors to an editorial team; actors, their representatives, or other people 
listed in the database can provide information as well. Several sociological studies have 
been published using this data and thus confirming its validity (Rossman/Esparza/Bo-
nacich 2010; Hsu 2006; Hsu/Hannan/Koçak 2009; Zuckerman/Kim 2003; Zuckerman, 
et al. 2003).
From the raw data, which is provided by imdb.com for noncommercial usage, I gener-
ate career profiles of male and female actors by their performances in feature films. I 
include an individual’s full career profile if he or she appeared at least once in a feature 
film produced in the United States. A career profile includes all of that person’s engage-
ments that were recorded in the database between the years 1900 and 2010. I only in-
clude performances in feature films and thereby exclude television productions, video-
only movies, and pornographic movies. The final dataset contains a total of 1,237,700 
engagements of 101,090 actors (of which 32,439 or 32 percent are female) in 483,949 
film productions.
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In a project-based labor market such as the film business, the most basic measure for 
career advancement is survival. As Faulkner and Anderson (1987) show for producers 
and directors in Hollywood, the majority drop out after one or two movie productions. 
Only a small fraction actually “survives” for more than two movies. Simply to stay in the 
business means to advance a successful career. Accordingly, I use event history meth-
ods in order to estimate factors that influence career survival (Cleves/Gould/Gutierrez 
2004). In particular, I use Cox regression to estimate hazards for career failure, that is, 
the risk of dropping out of the business.
Career failure is a binary variable that takes the value 1 at an actor’s last entry in the 
database – which constitutes an actor’s last performance. Otherwise, it is zero. Since the 
timeframe of the study ends in 2010, I do not know whether a career continues after 
2010. This points to the common problem of censoring in survival data (Cleves/Gould/
Gutierrez 2004: 29–32). To handle this problem, I treat only those actors who have been 
inactive within the ten years prior to 2010 as having failed careers.1 In other words, if an 
actor has not been involved in a production since 2000, I treat his or her last production 
as career failure = 1. If there is a record after 2000, I treat this career as ongoing, hence, 
career failure status = 0.
I fit Cox proportional hazard models (Cox 1972) because the literature suggests these 
as the most flexible instrument estimating survival data (Blossfeld/Rohwer 2002; Box-
Steffensmeier/Jones 2004; Cleves/Gould/Gutierrez 2004). Previous tests of the propor-
tionality assumption suggested that Cox modeling is appropriate. In order to surmount 
possible violations in the regression assumptions, such as error independence among 
observations, all estimations rely on robust standard errors clustered by actors (Lin/Wei 
1989). I also present the results of a few alternative model specifications and sensitivity 
analyses, in order to test the robustness of the discussed findings. 
Measurement of variables
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. Hypothesis 
H1 assumes that women face disadvantages when they work more often in cohesive 
team structures rather than in weaker structures. In order to measure the cohesion of 
a film production team, I follow De Vaan, Vedres, and Stark (2011: 13–14) and rely on 
their two related but distinct measures of social capital: interpersonal team familiarity 
and recurring cohesion. Interpersonal familiarity, developed by Newman (2001) in its 
core form, measures the intensity of prior relations between each pair of collaborators 
1 I repeated the analysis using a less conservative timeframe of five years. The results did not differ 
from those presented below; these can be made available upon request. 
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within a film production team. It is constructed in the following way: in a dataset sorted 
by the release date of each film, the strength of collaboration between individual i and 
j (if any) is given by
1 
f f
i j
ij
f f
w
n
δ δ
=
-∑
where δ i
f is 1 if i was part of film f and zero otherwise; likewise, δ i
f equals 1 if individ-
ual j was part of film f and zero otherwise. If there has been any collaboration between 
i and j in any film production, then δ δi
f
j
f will count as 1, and zero otherwise. nf  is the 
number of crew members in film f. By dividing by nf –1, I give collaborations in smaller 
productions a greater weight, assuming that members know each other better if they 
have worked together in crews of a smaller size as opposed to larger crews. wij then gives 
us a number of prior collaborations over all film productions for each pair of individu-
als in the dataset. I then calculate the sum of the off-diagonal, lower triangular values of 
wij for each film crew c in the dataset, and adjust it by crewsize nc. Note that taking the 
lower triangle elements prevents the same collaboration being counted twice. The sum 
yields a measure of interpersonal team familiarity:
Team familiarityc = 
1
n
w
c i j
ij
>
∑
Team familiarity conceptualizes social capital at the dyadic, person-to-person level. It 
measures the degree to which people in a current team know each other from past col-
laborations. It takes on the value 0 if no prior collaboration exists in a focal team. High-
er positive values indicate a greater degree of prior collaborations among the members 
of a crew. Naturally, this variable includes both weak and strong ties: I do not know 
whether a prior collaboration reflects a strong or weak relationship. The only thing 
I know is that two people have been colleagues in the past. In order to better capture 
possible closure tendencies from cohesion, I follow De Vaan et al. (2011: 13–14) and 
calculate their measure of recurring cohesion. Recurring cohesion considers cliques of at 
least three persons who have repeatedly collaborated in past productions. For instance, 
if actors A, B, and C worked together in a movie and repeat their collaboration in a 
later production, this later production is considered more cohesive because a full clique 
rather than just a dyadic relationship reassembles itself in a new team. Recurring cohe-
sion is calculated in the following way: for each film team in the dataset, I identify all 
cliques of three or more members who have collaborated in a prior film. Having identi-
fied qc cliques ranging from clique v=1 to qc for each team c, I measure the overlap of 
individuals recurring in these cliques. This results in a non-symmetric qc x qc matrix 
Lc, in which each entry Lvw
c contains the number of persons appearing both in clique v 
and w, recorded as a share of the number of persons in clique v. If Sv is the number of 
individuals of the current film crew c in clique v, and Sc is the number of individuals in 
film crew c, then recurring cohesion is given by:
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Recurring cohesionc =
+( )
−( )
≠∑v w vwc v
c
c
L S
S
q
1
2 1
The variable can be read as a team’s average degree of cohesion, measured as the extent 
to which past cliques of at least three persons reassemble in the current production. The 
quantity takes on the value 0 if no cohesion exists, that is, no clique of recurring col-
laboration is present in the focal team; it takes a positive value if there is cohesion in a 
team. Higher values indicate a greater degree of recurring cliques.
The second hypothesis assumes that gender disadvantages become less severe in careers 
in which a person associates more often with teams structured by open and diverse net-
works. It is assumed that these networks facilitate the flow of information in a way that 
benefits otherwise disadvantaged groups. In order to test this, I rely on three measures 
of team openness and information diversity. The first is simply the share of newcomers 
within a film team c. I follow Perretti and Negro (2006) as well as (March 1991) and 
assume that the higher the percentage of newcomers within a team is, the more likely it 
will be that fresh ideas are bought into the production, as well as new perspectives, new 
combinations of relationships, and heterogeneous information pools.
The second diversity measure takes into account the individual exposure to different 
genre backgrounds. Each film in the database is described using a total of 28 genre 
dummies (for a list, see Table A2 in the appendix), the combination of which deter-
mines the genre of the film. For example, the Spielberg movie E.T. (1982) is described 
by the three genre dummies “adventure,” “drama,” and “family” and Zemeckis’ Back to 
the Future (1985) as “adventure,” “comedy,” and “sci-fi.” I calculate Hsu’s (2006) mea-
sure of niche width, which is the total number of distinct genre categories that each film 
production addresses. In line with Hsu (2006) and Zuckerman et al. (2003), I assume 
that the broader an actor’s identity and genre spanning, measured by this quantity, the 
greater is the likely exposure to diverse and different categories, genres, and information 
pools. If an actor has a broad genre portfolio by having worked in diverse film projects, 
I assume the actor has access to a broad source of information, diverse categories and 
genre cultures, and different schools of thought.
While this measure takes individual genre diversity into account, I also calculate a team-
based genre-diversity measure. I assume that creative diversity, that is, the different 
genre backgrounds among the members in a film team, generates stylistic dissonance 
between different genre standards and the way cultural products are produced. This 
then creates an atmosphere of productive friction in which innovation and creative 
synergy within a team reaches an optimal level (Stark 2009). I assume that women can 
profit from this diversity because the exposure to various people with different cultural 
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genre backgrounds provides access to various sources of information and opens up 
beneficial opportunities in job searches – as opposed to uniform, homogenous film 
teams sharing basically the same artistic standards and the same channels of knowledge. 
To measure the genre diversity of a team, I calculate the distance measure used by Rodan 
and Galunic (2004), Phelps (2010), and De Vaan et al. (2011), which is based on Jaffe’s 
(1986: 986) well-known measure of proximity/dissimilarity. This distance measure cal-
culates the stylistic distance between each team member of a focal team based on their 
genre backgrounds from past productions. In order to construct this measure, I first 
quantify each actor’s genre history using the 28 distinct genre dummies. In doing this, I 
count the number of movies in each of the 28 genres in which an actor performed, up 
to each time point t. In a second step, I focus on the team level and calculate the sum 
of genre histories for all members of a focal film crew. I do this for all film teams in the 
dataset and for each of the 28 genres. This gives us a distribution showing the degree to 
which each genre k is represented within the experience background of the whole crew. 
I now calculate K-dimensional vectors fi = ( fi1, … , fiK ), where fik is the fraction of crew 
member i’s genre history in genre category k. Based on Jaffe (1986), the genre distance 
d between a team member i and j is derived by:
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That is, dij is one minus the length of the projection of the normed vector fi onto the 
normed vector fj. fi and fj have only non-negative entries, hence, the distance measure 
can take values between 0, representing complete similarity in the genre backgrounds 
between members i and j, and value 1, which stands for the maximum possible dis-
similarity in genre history between i and j. I then sum this index up for all members of 
a crew and adjust for team size. For each film crew c, this gives us a measure of genre 
diversity, which is defined as:
genre diversityc = 
1
n
d
c i j
ij
>
∑
where dij is the genre distance measure of crew member i from j, and nc the number of 
crew members of focal film crew c. Again, note that the measure takes the off-diagonal 
elements of the lower triangle of the distance matrix into account and adjusts for crew 
size.
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Control variables
I control for a number of variables at the film- and person-specific level that should 
have an effect on career survival chances. Age (in years): this variable is calculated from 
the birth year information in the database. I assume that the hazard rate for career 
failure increases with age. Number of movies produced: this is a human capital variable 
reflecting job experience, as measured by the number of movies with which an actor 
had been associated by time point t. Greater job experience should decrease the risk of 
career failure. Cumulative number of awards: this variable measures star power or cu-
mulative advantages in the sense of DiPrete and Eirich (2006). In constructing this vari-
able, I record all award nominations and winnings an actor received personally (best 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Career failure 0.031649 0.175064 0 1
Career duration 12.1074 11.2007 0.002732 84.8333
Predictors
Female 0.266401 0.442077 0 1
Age 40.6077 14.6657 3 86
Number of movies produced 40.9446 64.0755 1 1456
Cumulative number of awards 0.181304 1.40389 0 93
Cumulative billing position 155.626 211.884 0 11444
Number of roles not credited 18.1555 42.8473 0 1402
Origin USA 0.573848 0.494517 0 1
Origin UK 0.050935 0.219865 0 1
Origin Germany 0.021784 0.145978 0 1
Origin France 0.027591 0.163797 0 1
Origin Italy 0.021786 0.145983 0 1
Has been producer 0.19658 4.13839 0 1094
Has been director 0.789998 8.16801 0 619
Titles in English 30.8966 57.2004 0 1005
US productions 33.1733 63.542 0 1449
Major titles 38.7743 62.8823 0 1448
Sequels 1.13211 2.76291 0 287
Novels 5.08121 8.3098 0 140
Crew size 43.6656 43.6911 1 1311
Genre: Thriller/Crime -0.002524 1.00716 -3.51662 4.95341
Genre: Family/Adventure/Comedy 0.040625 1.02102 -1.64034 8.49889
Genre: Action/Adventure/Western 0.009935 1.04174 -3.36408 11.3632
Genre: Drama/Romance/History 0.215343 0.965018 -7.69608 3.73876
Person per movie ratio 13.1297 5.23889 0.554348 22.8402
Team familiarity 0.170715 1.07764 0 73.0201
Recurring cohesion 2.34127 6.70374 0 310.24
Share of newcomers 0.175633 0.179326 0 1
Niche width 2.08138 1.09393 0 10
Genre diversity 0.306902 0.054462 0 0.42085
Note: N = 1,237,700 actor-film observations.
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male or female actor, best supporting role, etc.) for a film production at an important 
film festival. I use awards data from the 44 most important film festivals worldwide (for 
a detailed list, see Table A2), including the fourteen most important US film awards, all 
fourteen international “A” film festivals, and another sixteen “B” film festivals.2 Cumula-
tive billing position: this variable represents the ranking position occupied by an actor 
within the credits of a production. The billing position is available in the database for 
each film production that offers a competitive role ranking. The lower this number, 
the better the position: billing position number 1 represents the leading role, position 
2 the second leading role, position 3 the main supporting role, and so on. Usually, the 
ranking is a competitive part of the contract and reflects an actor’s star power or ability 
to negotiate a starring role within a production. A better ranking is usually associated 
with greater visibility, pay, and audience recognition, and should therefore positively 
affect an actor’s reputation and ability to acquire future engagements. I accumulate this 
variable over all engagements in order to reflect past experiences and leading roles that 
might still affect future engagements. Number of roles not credited: not all roles within a 
production are ranked by the billing position. Roles below the top-10 or top-20 cast are 
often not listed in the credits. This variable records the cumulative number of movies 
an actor was engaged in without having a credited role. Career survival chances should 
be higher if this variable is lower on average. Origin: I include five dummy variables 
to control for an actor’s country of origin. The five dummies reflect the most frequent 
birthplaces in the database, which is the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Italy. All remaining birthplaces act as the reference category. Has been 
producer/director: actors also work as directors or producers, which normally demon-
strates a stronger and stable career position (Baker/Faulkner 1991). I  include two mea-
sures that count the cumulative number of movies at time point t in which an actor 
has worked as a producer or director, respectively. Titles in English: this variable is the 
number of English-language productions an actor appeared in. Potential audiences and 
box office returns are much larger if a movie has been produced in English or has been 
translated into the English language. Especially for actors who are not native English 
speakers, this signals a higher visibility and a higher likelihood to sustain a career. US 
productions: this variable sums up the number of US-produced movies an actor ap-
peared in. Similar to the previous variable, this one reflects international visibility since 
most American productions are marketed worldwide. Major titles: this variable is the 
number of major movie productions in which an actor performed. Contrary to inde-
pendent movies, major productions have a higher budget, a greater number of theater 
screenings, and eventually, more box office returns. Sequels: this measure represents 
the cumulative number of productions in a sequel in which an actor appeared. Sequels 
(for example, Rocky III) often attract large audiences and return much higher profits 
than non-sequels. Novels: similarly, productions based on a novel often yield higher 
return rates. This measure represents the number of times an actor appeared in films 
with a novel-based script. Crew size: this figure shows the number of crew members 
2 An encyclopedic overview on movie awards is given by Gebert (1996) and O’Neil (2001). See 
Gemser et al. (2008) for an analysis on how these awards signal quality. 
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for each engagement and thus represents a proxy for the movie budget (for a similar 
approach see: Rossman/Esparza/Bonacich 2010: 40), since costly productions usually 
have larger crews. Genre factor variables: to control for possible genre effects, four vari-
ables − Thriller/Crime; Family/Adventure/Comedy; Action/Adventure/Western; Drama/
Romance/History − represent the factor scores from a principal component analysis on 
the 28 genre dummies that classify every film production in the dataset. Table A1 in the 
appendix displays the varimax-rotated solution of the factor analysis. Person per movie 
ratio: this variable reflects the opportunity structure for each actor in the business. If a 
higher number of actors compete for a fewer number of available jobs in a particular 
year, I assume that the hazard rates of career failure are increased. The variable is de-
fined as the total number of actors in a given year, divided by the total number of mov-
ies released in that year.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the results of a set of nested model estimations. For all metric variables, 
I use logged values to control for skewness and to account for diminishing marginal re-
turns of success.3 I begin with a baseline model in which I enter the female dummy and 
all control variables (Model 1). As can be seen from Model 1, female artists have a circa 
10-percent higher risk of failure than their male colleagues. The effect remains robust 
across all model specifications. Controlling for all other factors in the model, I find that 
women drop out of the business much earlier than men. 
The remaining controls are all in line with the expectations. Age has a significant posi-
tive effect. The risk of failure increases with seniority. At the same time, job experience 
lowers the risk of ending a career. The same holds true for number of awards: the more 
awards an actor receives, the more the risk for career failure is reduced. In the same 
way, having a portfolio of higher ranked billing positions increases career survival time. 
Cumulative advantages, or Matthew effects (Merton 1968; DiPrete/Eirich 2006), seem 
to be a critical factor for survival in the film business. Similarly, actors who have worked 
as a producer or director also increase their career chances, although the director effect 
is not a robust effect across all models. Appearing in international English-language 
productions, having a major distributor, and being part in a sequel are further factors 
that greatly increase survival chances. However, productions based on novels decrease 
the chances to survive. The same holds true for actors appearing in US productions – 
as compared with actors working in other countries. Actors based in the United States 
have lesser chances for survival because the US business is probably more competitive 
than film industries in other countries. The effects of the origin variables point in the 
3 For all variables that have a zero value, I add the constant 1 to the variable in order to enable 
taking the natural logarithm. 
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Table 2 Main results: Cox regressions on career failure hazards
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.097***
(8.657)
0.091***
(8.124)
0.092***
(8.169)
0.092***
(8.165)
0.043**
(3.018)
0.604***
(6.138)
Age (ln) 0.120***
(7.317)
0.128***
(7.836)
0.126***
(7.674)
0.128***
(7.800)
0.128***
(7.810)
0.128***
(7.784)
Number of movies
produced (ln)
-0.213***
(-9.456)
-0.224***
(-9.957)
-0.203***
(-9.028)
-0.217***
(-9.637)
-0.219***
(-9.741)
-0.225***
(-9.992)
Cumulative number 
of awards (ln)
-1.011***
(-24.025)
-0.986***
(-23.565)
-0.993***
(-23.668)
-0.979***
(-23.414)
-0.978***
(-23.368)
-0.979***
(-23.338)
Cumulative billing 
position (ln)
0.055***
(11.058)
0.069***
(13.675)
0.068***
(13.602)
0.075***
(14.822)
0.075***
(14.978)
0.076***
(15.087)
Number of roles
not credited (ln)
0.165***
(15.957)
0.139***
(13.473)
0.153***
(14.911)
0.137***
(13.263)
0.140***
(13.584)
0.143***
(13.809)
Origin USA 0.024+
(1.774)
0.034*
(2.559)
0.033*
(2.522)
0.038**
(2.890)
0.037**
(2.799)
0.036**
(2.700)
Origin UK 0.159***
(6.743)
0.157***
(6.598)
0.158***
(6.702)
0.161***
(6.767)
0.159***
(6.704)
0.157***
(6.608)
Origin Germany -0.059
(-1.468)
-0.047
(-1.185)
-0.049
(-1.205)
-0.041
(-1.018)
-0.041
(-1.019)
-0.040
(-0.989)
Origin France -0.088*
(-2.233)
-0.071+
(-1.800)
-0.072+
(-1.840)
-0.060
(-1.525)
-0.059
(-1.504)
-0.059
(-1.499)
Origin Italy 0.019
(0.451)
0.016
(0.369)
0.009
(0.209)
0.014
(0.332)
0.015
(0.358)
0.018
(0.429)
Has been producer 
(ln)
-0.417***
(-13.694)
-0.397***
(-13.125)
-0.405***
(-13.381)
-0.393***
(-12.977)
-0.395***
(-13.018)
-0.395***
(-12.973)
Has been director (ln) -0.035*
(-2.238)
-0.023
(-1.391)
-0.019
(-1.230)
-0.014
(-0.860)
-0.011
(-0.673)
-0.004
(-0.235)
Titles in English (ln) -0.287***
(-16.648)
-0.275***
(-15.789)
-0.272***
(-15.759)
-0.266***
(-15.231)
-0.264***
(-15.124)
-0.261***
(-14.911)
US productions (ln) 0.668***
(41.120)
0.669***
(40.562)
0.647***
(39.739)
0.653***
(39.696)
0.653***
(39.705)
0.652***
(39.584)
Major titles (ln) -0.144***
(-8.108)
-0.207***
(-11.665)
-0.205***
(-11.562)
-0.225***
(-12.690)
-0.225***
(-12.712)
-0.224***
(-12.655)
Sequels (ln) -0.170***
(-12.984)
-0.178***
(-13.704)
-0.182***
(-13.910)
-0.186***
(-14.233)
-0.184***
(-14.095)
-0.181***
(-13.867)
Novels (ln) 0.119***
(10.917)
0.134***
(12.342)
0.113***
(10.361)
0.124***
(11.342)
0.124***
(11.312)
0.126***
(11.500)
Crew size (ln) -0.009
(-1.152)
-0.089***
(-11.166)
0.038***
(4.978)
-0.030***
(-3.521)
-0.031***
(-3.709)
-0.032***
(-3.823)
Genre:  
Thriller/Crime
-0.040***
(-8.271)
-0.034***
(-6.920)
-0.025***
(-4.738)
-0.018***
(-3.337)
-0.017**
(-3.148)
-0.017**
(-3.146)
Genre: Family/
Adventure/Comedy
0.026***
(5.696)
0.020***
(4.435)
0.049***
(8.862)
0.050***
(8.991)
0.051***
(9.131)
0.051***
(9.179)
Genre: Action/
Adventure/Western   
0.010*
(2.357)
0.010*
(2.237)
0.012**
(2.658)
0.013**
(2.948)
0.013**
(3.006)
0.012**
(2.634)
Genre: Drama/
Romance/History   
0.069***
(13.063)
0.072***
(13.465)
0.109***
(17.852)
0.111***
(17.846)
0.112***
(18.030)
0.113***
(18.120)
Person per  
movie ratio
0.018***
(12.841)
0.026***
(18.055)
0.029***
(19.533)
0.030***
(20.373)
0.030***
(20.354)
0.030***
(20.368)
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same direction. Actors born in English-speaking countries face greater career hazards, 
whereas French or German actors have greater chances for career survival.4 Crew size 
is negative in most models. This means that being part of a production with a larger 
crew and probably with a larger budget reduces the risks for failure and increases career 
duration time.
Models 2−4 add the main predictors to the model. Model 2 enters the first set of pre-
dictors: familiarity and cohesion. Model 3 includes the second set (share of newcomers, 
niche width, and genre diversity). In Model 4, all main predictors are included together. 
As can be seen from the results, interpersonal familiarity reduces the likelihood of fail-
ure, whereas recurring cohesion considerably increases it. In previous model estima-
tions, which are not shown but can be made available upon request, the familiarity 
4 This is partly due to a success bias for non-US actors in the sample, in which I included all actors 
who appeared in a US production at least once in their career. It is clear that actors from other 
countries selected for the sample are to some extent, at least in terms of international visibility, 
the most successful ones from their home countries. However, since I control for country of 
origin as well as for human capital and career success measures, this possible selection bias is 
largely negligible and does not affect the main research question.
Team familiarity (ln) -0.299***
(-5.442)
-0.208***
(-3.848)
-0.123*
(-2.103)
-0.215***
(-3.948)
Recurring cohesion (ln) 0.321***
(25.485)
0.235***
(16.666)
0.194***
(12.667)
0.237***
(16.800)
Share of newcomers (ln) -1.521***
(-30.333)
-0.928***
(-15.240)
-0.921***
(-15.119)
-0.620***
(-9.069)
Niche width (ln) -0.309***
(-14.736)
-0.289***
(-13.619)
-0.292***
(-13.762)
-0.243***
(-10.342)
Genre diversity (ln) -4.142***
(-29.084)
-3.241***
(-20.866)
-3.222***
(-20.739)
-2.974***
(-16.819)
Female*familiarity -0.272*
(-2.366)
Female*cohesion 0.128***
(5.525)
Female*newcomers -0.887***
(-9.663)
Female*niche width -0.143***
(-4.453)
Female*genre 
diversity
-0.614*
(-2.281)
Log-likelihood -405463.302 -405029.368 -404965.115 -404797.145 -404778.895 -404725.585
Chi2 6233.637 7229.102 7398.253 7757.575 7767.220 7798.505
AIC 810974.604 810110.735 809984.230 809652.289 809619.791 809515.170
N (actors) 101090 101090 101090 101090 101090 101090
N (actor-film 
observations)
1237700 1237700 1237700 1237700 1237700 1237700
Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; t statistics in parentheses; two-sided tests; ln=logged 
variable.
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effect is positive at first and then turns negative after the cohesion variable is included 
in the model. This speaks to what Uzzi and Spiro (2005) argue in their paper on col-
laboration and performance in musical productions, namely that social capital has a 
nonlinear, u-shaped effect. Here I demonstrate this for individual careers: on one side, 
a certain degree of trust and social capital in terms of “familiar” structures, measured 
by dyadic repeated collaborations, works to benefit the advancement of careers. On the 
other, too much social capital, measured here in terms of durable, recurring cohesion 
of 3+ cliques, becomes a form of overembeddedness that works against career advance-
ment.
The coefficients of the information/genre diversity variables all point in the same direc-
tion and show negative signs. This means that chances for career survival are increased 
if actors pursue their career in open teams with greater genre diversity and higher per-
centages of newcomers. In addition, as the niche width variable shows, they have greater 
survival rates when they occupy a broader genre portfolio.
How do these effects vary between female and male actors? Can women reduce their 
disadvantaged position through open network structures, as suggested by the hypoth-
eses? Models 5 and 6 specify interaction effects between the female dummy and the 
network and information/genre diversity predictors. The signs of the interaction terms 
support both hypotheses H1 and H2. In order to facilitate interpretation, I follow Bram-
bor, Clark, and Golder (2006: 73) and display the entire range of values of the interac-
tion effects in a marginal effects diagram. The standard coefficient of the multiplicative 
interaction term in the regression model does not reveal enough substantial insight, 
since its value depends on the values of the constitutive terms and only refers to a single 
scenario – that is, when one of the constitutive variables is zero. Displaying the marginal 
effects graphically allows us to examine how and with what statistical precision the ef-
fects change over time across the whole range of meaningful values.
Figures 1 and 2 graph the interaction effects. The figures show point estimates of the 
model-based conditional marginal effects of the gender dummy across the whole range 
of values for the respective predictor, keeping constant all variables of the full model. 
The figures also graph the upper and lower bounds of the 95-percent confidence inter-
val. The effects are significant at 95 percent when the y-zero line is outside the interval. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, H1 is supported. The differences in the likelihood of career 
survival between male and female actors clearly become stronger as the cohesion vari-
able increases. At the same time, gender disadvantages are reduced with higher degrees 
of familiarity, after I have controlled for cohesion and all other variables in the model. 
Figure 2 graphs the interaction effects of the diversity variables. Again, results support 
H2. The differences between males and females in career survival become less strong as 
information diversity and team openness increases. The broader the niche width, the 
more newcomers in a team, and the greater the team’s genre diversity, the better the 
chances become for women, or, to put it differently, the more equal is the duration of a 
career between males and females. 
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Figure 1 Marginal effects of the female dummy on the risk of career failure, 
 conditional on social capital measures, with 95-percent confidence levels 
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Figure 2 Marginal effects of the female dummy on the risk of career failure, 
 conditional on diversity measures, with 95-percent confidence levels
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Table 3 Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.148***
(24.137)
0.148***
(24.177)
0.095***
(12.140)
0.507***
(10.446)
0.147***
(9.206)
1.200***
(11.931)
Age (ln) 0.298***
(32.772)
0.299***
(32.948)
0.299***
(32.930)
0.300***
(33.028)
0.686***
(33.896)
0.687***
(33.968)
Number of movies 
produced (ln)
-0.717***
(-69.259)
-0.703***
(-65.837)
-0.706***
(-65.916)
-0.709***
(-66.082)
-1.479***
(-67.332)
-1.485***
(-67.497)
Cumulative number 
of awards (ln)
-0.532***
(-27.787)
-0.533***
(-27.965)
-0.532***
(-27.940)
-0.531***
(-27.919)
-1.157***
(-25.300)
-1.160***
(-25.333)
Cumulative billing 
position (ln)
0.027***
(10.197)
0.027***
(9.997)
0.027***
(10.258)
0.028***
(10.363)
0.061***
(11.171)
0.061***
(11.187)
Number of roles not 
credited (ln)
0.068***
(13.248)
0.066***
(12.907)
0.069***
(13.451)
0.070***
(13.623)
0.164***
(14.373)
0.165***
(14.441)
Origin USA 0.031***
(4.286)
0.031***
(4.252)
0.029***
(4.077)
0.028***
(3.946)
0.031*
(2.054)
0.029+
(1.935)
Origin UK 0.091***
(6.872)
0.091***
(6.876)
0.089***
(6.694)
0.089***
(6.667)
0.163***
(5.882)
0.162***
(5.834)
Origin Germany -0.014
(-0.693)
-0.013
(-0.612)
-0.012
(-0.603)
-0.012
(-0.598)
-0.065
(-1.462)
-0.065
(-1.458)
Origin France -0.041*
(-2.108)
-0.042*
(-2.140)
-0.041*
(-2.104)
-0.042*
(-2.118)
-0.070
(-1.613)
-0.071
(-1.631)
Origin Italy 0.037+
(1.755)
0.036+
(1.733)
0.037+
(1.775)
0.039+
(1.872)
0.052
(1.152)
0.057
(1.250)
Has been producer 
(ln)
-0.193***
(-11.141)
-0.192***
(-11.153)
-0.196***
(-11.326)
-0.196***
(-11.315)
-0.416***
(-10.441)
-0.414***
(-10.370)
Has been director (ln) 0.024*
(2.326)
0.022*
(2.115)
0.025*
(2.391)
0.028**
(2.665)
0.054*
(2.245)
0.060*
(2.502)
Titles in English (ln) -0.114***
(-13.608)
-0.114***
(-13.662)
-0.113***
(-13.509)
-0.112***
(-13.333)
-0.297***
(-14.784)
-0.295***
(-14.628)
US productions (ln) 0.328***
(41.201)
0.328***
(41.201)
0.329***
(41.297)
0.329***
(41.162)
0.773***
(40.520)
0.772***
(40.442)
Major titles (ln) 0.078***
(7.973)
0.071***
(7.283)
0.072***
(7.325)
0.073***
(7.405)
0.077***
(3.827)
0.079***
(3.939)
Sequels (ln) -0.072***
(-11.244)
-0.075***
(-11.534)
-0.074***
(-11.348)
-0.074***
(-11.348)
-0.137***
(-9.428)
-0.137***
(-9.423)
Novels (ln) 0.103***
(18.903)
0.100***
(18.300)
0.100***
(18.335)
0.102***
(18.546)
0.267***
(22.167)
0.269***
(22.352)
Crew size (ln) -0.021***
(-4.740)
-0.020***
(-4.598)
-0.021***
(-4.846)
-0.021***
(-4.848)
-0.041***
(-4.592)
-0.041***
(-4.590)
Genre: Thriller/Crime -0.031***
(-11.466)
-0.031***
(-11.464)
-0.030***
(-11.161)
-0.030***
(-11.220)
-0.063***
(-11.130)
-0.063***
(-11.193)
Genre: Family/
Adventure/Comedy
0.017***
(5.732)
0.017***
(5.821)
0.018***
(6.157)
0.018***
(6.138)
0.039***
(6.500)
0.039***
(6.473)
Genre: Action/
Adventure/Western   
0.022***
(9.981)
0.023***
(10.100)
0.023***
(10.347)
0.022***
(9.798)
0.041***
(9.112)
0.039***
(8.545)
Genre: Drama/
Romance/History   
0.015***
(4.567)
0.015***
(4.589)
0.016***
(4.874)
0.016***
(4.834)
0.038***
(5.619)
0.038***
(5.618)
Person per movie 
ratio
0.031***
(40.516)
0.031***
(40.617)
0.031***
(40.651)
0.032***
(40.924)
0.076***
(44.810)
0.076***
(45.025)
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In addition, Table 3 tests the robustness of the results. These tests show that the results 
are not sensitive under different specifications and that the main effects remain unaf-
fected. In particular, I use discrete-time estimations using probit regressions with dif-
ferent specifications of time (quadratic and cubic polynomials in Model 1 and 2), as 
suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010). Model 3 and 4 add the interaction effects to 
the cubic specification. As can be seen, results remain robust and do not change. Model 
5 and 6 specify a complementary log-log regression, as recommended by Buckley and 
Westerland (2004), or as used by Dobbin et al. (2011). Again, the interaction effects do 
not differ. To sum up, results are not driven by a specific estimation method. Hence, the 
two hypotheses are supported by this analysis. The results can be regarded as robust.
Team familiarity (ln) 0.038
(1.539)
0.035
(1.438)
0.066*
(2.504)
0.031
(1.235)
0.092
(1.609)
0.015
(0.281)
Recurring cohesion (ln) 0.053***
(7.987)
0.053***
(7.947)
0.021**
(2.799)
0.056***
(8.388)
0.066***
(4.037)
0.154***
(10.561)
Share of newcomers 
(ln)
-0.141***
(-4.636)
-0.144***
(-4.739)
-0.140***
(-4.591)
0.079*
(2.310)
-0.248***
(-3.853)
0.265***
(3.579)
Niche width (ln) -0.101***
(-9.445)
-0.101***
(-9.447)
-0.104***
(-9.785)
-0.077***
(-6.550)
-0.200***
(-8.995)
-0.130***
(-5.245)
Genre diversity (ln) -0.990***
(-12.278)
-0.975***
(-12.081)
-0.967***
(-11.969)
-0.776***
(-8.341)
-1.992***
(-12.067)
-1.441***
(-7.502)
t1 0.028***
(32.351)
0.023***
(14.754)
0.023***
(14.778)
0.023***
(14.846)
0.042***
(14.707)
0.042***
(14.753)
t2 -0.000
(-0.822)
0.000***
(3.772)
0.000***
(3.752)
0.000***
(3.667)
0.001***
(5.105)
0.001***
(5.052)
t3 -0.000***
(-3.830)
-0.000***
(-3.822)
-0.000***
(-3.757)
-0.000***
(-6.501)
-0.000***
(-6.474)
Table 3, continued
Female*familiarity -0.103+
(-1.834)
-0.241*
(-2.074)
Female*cohesion 0.107***
(9.431)
0.261***
(10.785)
Female*newcomers -0.673***
(-14.662)
-1.510***
(-15.599)
Female*niche width -0.080***
(-4.920)
-0.200***
(-5.958)
Female*genre 
diversity
-0.516***
(-3.767)
-1.466***
(-5.294)
Constant -2.604***
(-58.755)
-2.602***
(-58.950)
-2.586***
(-58.565)
-2.736***
(-57.117)
-5.358***
(-55.863)
-5.745***
(-55.248)
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.147
Log-likelihood -148517.701 -148502.085 -148428.796 -148339.974 -148314.439 -148229.087
Chi2 29838.753 29996.661 30000.705 30065.986 35518.105 35725.779
AIC 297099.403 297070.170 296927.591 296751.948 296698.877 296530.173
N (actors) 101090 101090 101090 101090 101090 101090
N (actor-film 
observations)
1237700 1237700 1237700 1237700 1237700 1237700
Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; t statistics in parentheses; two-sided tests.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
On the basis of a large-scale, longitudinal career database consisting of more than a 
hundred thousand film actors and covering over one million film engagements, this 
study analyzed how measures of cohesion, social capital, and information diversity 
moderate gender disadvantages in pursuing careers in film. On the basis of previous 
case-study research and reasoning from social network theory, I argued that women are 
likely to suffer from cohesive social structures but can take advantage of less cohesive, 
weaker structures that are more open with regard to job-relevant information flow. In 
order to test these assumptions, I employed interaction effects between gender and dif-
ferent measures of social capital and information diversity on career survival hazards. 
The presented results support the proposed assumptions: gender disadvantages grow 
significantly with increases in team cohesion, but differences are reduced in teams with 
weaker social ties and higher degrees of information diversity. If women pursue their 
career in open and diverse network architectures, they can reduce their disadvantaged 
position and the risk of dropping out of the business to a level that is statistically in-
distinguishable from the risk men run. The more open and diverse team structures be-
come, the more gender equality can be expected in project-based career advancement. 
The findings of this study contribute valuable insights in at least four different ways. 
First, the study shows how and what type of social capital works in favor of or against 
disadvantaged labor market groups. It should be noted that this study focuses on ca-
reers in which gender disadvantages do not result from direct competition between 
males and females – male and female jobs are mostly predefined with the film’s script – 
but rather from disadvantages at an aggregate level. The sociological causes of these dis-
advantages lie beyond the scope of this study. Gender disadvantages might be induced 
through processes of allocative discrimination (Petersen/Saporta 2004), through moth-
erhood penalties, or through discrimination by gatekeepers based on ascriptive rather 
than meritocratic judgments. Differences in careers between males and females might 
also be induced through self-inflicted changes in personal preference structures, yield-
ing different human capital investments across genders (e.g. Becker 1975). What this 
study contributes instead is to show how observed career inequalities between males 
and females decrease or increase through different forms of network embeddedness. 
In doing this, the article particularly shows that careers in cohesive networks can be 
a “double jeopardy” (Lincoln/Allen 2004) for women who already face disadvantaged 
labor market conditions. 
Second, in the literature it has been rarely studied how different mechanisms of inequal-
ity interact with each other. Do they lessen or intensify the severity of inequality, and if 
so, how? As consequence, cumulative or conditional effects of inequality have remained 
poorly understood. By analyzing interaction effects on individual career data, this study 
is able to capture the conditional nature of social inequality. Hence, it contributes to a 
better understanding of the complex effects, multiple or cumulative, between different 
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factors of social inequality (DiPrete/Eirich 2006). Moreover, this study shows that in-
equalities inherently depend on factors that are social by nature and therefore heeds the 
call to study more seriously the social structures of inequality (Lutter 2012b). 
Third, it was the purpose of this study to systematically analyze assumptions which have 
been long discussed in the literature but never quantitatively stated. Single-case studies 
have showed us that women are disadvantaged in labor markets based on informal re-
cruitment practices through interpersonal networks. To the best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first to examine these insights based on a large-scale longitudinal dataset, 
using sophisticated measures of social capital and information diversity. In doing this, it 
explores a unique dataset covering a labor market in its entirety, including all products 
that have ever been produced in that market and all actors who have been ever involved 
in making these products. Seldom in sociological research have we been able to gain 
insights from a full population of labor market actors. 
Fourth, although the empirical setting is based on a specific artistic labor market, I be-
lieve that the findings can be generalized beyond this cultural industry and expanded 
to other flexible, project-based labor markets. Examples could be the market for man-
agers, architects, journalists, designers, academics, or even engineers working in fast-
changing high-tech areas. Future research could and should try to apply the indicators 
used here to these other fields. It would be especially interesting to look at careers in 
which jobs are not pre-defined for males and females, but are open and competitive to 
both genders. It would be interesting to see if the same results can be obtained. This 
would not only prove and validate the findings presented here but would contribute to 
an advanced understanding of how inequalities emerge, why they intensify, and, most 
important, under what conditions inequalities disappear.
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6 Appendix
Table A1 Awards used for this study
Awards USA International “A” festivals International “B” festivals 
Academy Awards
Broadcast Film Critics  
Association Awards
Directors Guild of  
America Awards
Golden Globe Awards
Independent Spirit Awards
Laurel Awards
Los Angeles Film Critics  
Association Awards
MTV Movie Awards
National Board of  
Review Awards
National Society of Film  
Critics Awards
New York Film Critics  
Circle Awards
People‘s Choice Awards
Screen Actors Guild Awards
Writers Guild of  
America Awards
Berlin International  
Film Festival
Cairo International  
Film Festival
Cannes Film Festival
International Film  
Festival of India
Karlovy Vary International  
Film Festival
Locarno International  
Film Festival
Mar del Plata  
Film Festival
Montreal World  
Film Festival
Moscow International  
Film Festival
San Sebastian International 
Film Festival
Shanghai International  
Film Festival
Tokyo International  
Film Festival
Venice Film Festival
Warsaw International  
Film Festival
European Film Awards
German Film Awards
Ghent International Film 
Festival
London Critics Circle  
Film Awards
London Film Festival
Miami International  
Film Festival
Monaco International  
Film Festival
Moondance International  
Film Festival
Norwegian International  
Film Festival
Sarajevo Film Festival
Seattle International  
Film Festival
Thessaloniki Film Festival
Toronto International  
Film Festival
Undine Awards, Austria
Vienna International  
Film Festival
Zurich Film Festival 
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Table A2 Rotated factor loadings and unique variances, from principal component 
 factor analysis
Genre Factor 1
Thriller/
Crime
Factor 2
Family/
Adventure/
Comedy
Factor 3
Action/
Adventure/ 
Western
Factor 4
Drama/ 
Romance/  
History
Uniqueness
Short -0.2052 -0.1457 -0.2466 -0.3365 0.7626
Drama 0.1079 -0.1662 0.7106 0.4466
Comedy -0.1953 0.243 -0.5792 -0.1944 0.5295
Romance -0.1121 0.2432 -0.1073 0.3886 0.7658
Action 0.2198 0.2652 0.5413 0.5851
Animation 0.5289 -0.108 0.7039
Thriller 0.6741 0.1727 0.5137
Family 0.6406 0.5704
Crime 0.5547 0.2781 0.6134
Adventure 0.5193 0.4661 0.5102
Music -0.1889 0.1553 0.9357
Horror 0.3881 -0.3283 0.7309
Fantasy 0.5506 0.6872
Mystery 0.5278 0.7197
Sci-fi 0.2638 0.2219 0.2365 -0.3157 0.7256
Western -0.1933 0.3326 -0.2806 0.764
Musical -0.1371 0.1933 -0.2804 0.8559
Biography -0.244 0.2574 0.2675 0.7945
Sport 0.1385 0.9651
War -0.1923 0.3311 0.3173 0.7526
History -0.2594 0.4021 0.2751 0.6928
Film noir 0.2969 0.2216 0.8486
Adult 0.9873
Reality 0.9997
News 0.993
Game show 0.9991
Documentary -0.23 -0.2509 0.1886 -0.237 0.7924
Talk show 0.9993
Note: Blanks represent factor loadings <.1.
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